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The Relationship Between Monetary and  
Macroprudential Policies† 
By JONG KU KANG* 
This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and 
macroprudential policies mainly in the context of the non-cooperation 
among policy authorities. Each policy authority’s optimal response is 
to tighten its policy measures when other authorities’ policy measures 
are loosened. This indicates that the two policies are substitutes for 
each other. This result still holds when an additional financial stability 
mandate is assigned to the central bank. The condition for the 
response functions to converge to a Nash equilibrium state is analyzed 
along with the speed of convergence, showing that they depend on the 
authorities’ preferences and the number of mandates assigned to 
policy authorities. If the financial supervisory authority (FSA) assigns 
greater importance to the output gap or a stronger financial stability 
mandate is assigned to the central bank (CB), the probability of non-
convergence increases and the speed of convergence declines even 
when the condition of convergence is satisfied. Meanwhile, if the CB 
considers output stability as an important task, the probability of 
convergence and the speed of converging to a state of equilibrium are 
high. Finally, when a single mandate or small number of mandates 
is/are assigned to each authority, stability is more quickly restored as 
compared to when many mandates are assigned. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
ince the global financial crisis, many central banks around the world have 
introduced financial stability as one of their key mandates. This is mainly 
driven by the change in policymakers’ views that a central bank’s role is very 
important in achieving macroprudential soundness in the economy. Especially 
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when there is either too much or too little credit supply in financial markets, there 
has been a growing demand for aggressive actions by central banks.  
On the other hand, it is expected that policy authorities around the world will 
introduce counter-cyclical capital buffers (CCB) in the near future. The main 
purpose of a CCB is to accumulate a capital buffer during boom periods, which can 
be used to protect banks and help them carry out their financial intermediation 
functions steadily, even during periods of recession. One of the other important 
aims of a CCB is to reduce the build-up of financial risk in advance.  
As the levels of required CCB can vary over business cycles or credit cycles, it is 
evident that the CCB policy affects output and inflation, which are the main  
target variables for monetary policy. This makes the coordination between 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy one of the most important tasks for 
policymakers.  
There has been some research on the coordination between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. Several studies have analyzed the coordination issue with 
DSGE models. For example, Angelini et al. (2012), using a DSGE model with  
the banking sector, analyze the European financial market and argue that 
macroprudential policies are beneficial, especially when there are shocks in the 
financial or housing markets as opposed to shocks from the supply side. Beau et al. 
(2012), with a DSGE model for the euro area, find that macroprudential policies 
have either a limited or a stabilizing effect on inflation. Paoli and Paustian (2013) 
set a DSGE model with nominal rigidities and credit constraints, finding that if 
faced with cost-push shocks, policy authorities must cooperate and commit to a 
given course of action to maximize the level of social welfare.  
Though these DSGE models are capable of measuring the relative effectiveness 
of macroprudential policies compared to monetary policies, they have limitations 
when used to analyze one policy authority’s response to another’s actions, not to 
mention the fact that the results depend on the details of parameter calibration.  
The second strand of studies in this area directly derives agents’ response 
functions. Cecchetti and Kohler (2014), using a simple model, analyze the behavior 
of policy authorities. In the full cooperation situation, they find that capital 
adequacy requirements and policy interest rates can substitute for each other to 
meet the objective of stabilizing prices and output volatility levels,1 whereas the 
relationship does not hold when policymakers try to achieve financial stability as 
well as price and output stability at the same time. Hence, they argue that 
policymakers need to coordinate macroprudential and monetary policies. Using a 
model with fiscal and monetary authorities, Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) 
demonstrate that if the fiscal authority has an additional mandate that is unrelated 
to social welfare, then social welfare maximum cannot be achieved. On the other 
hand, Smets (2014) notes that if macroprudential instruments are not effective, then 
monetary policy instruments can be used to stabilize the financial market.  
In many papers, including those by Cecchetti and Kohler (2014) and Paoli and 
Paustian (2013), loan interest rates or the gap between loan interest rates and the 
 
1This means that when the regulatory capital ratio rises, the central bank must reduce the policy interest rate 
and when the policy interest rate cut the financial supervisory agency needs to raise the regulatory capital ratio to 
maximize their utility functions. 
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policy interest rate are used as a financial stability indicator. What brings about a 
financial market crisis is an excessive expansion of the credit supply rather than 
credit demand. Considering that the gap between loan interest rates and the policy 
interest rate tends to expand when the loan supply as well as loan demand increase, 
responding to changes in the gap may mislead policymakers. As a financial 
stability indicator, this paper employs the credit-to-GDP ratio.2 Drehmann et al. 
(2011) and Drehmann and Juselius (2013) from the BIS suggest that it is desirable 
to use the credit-to-GDP ratio, as it performs better than any other indicator when 
predicting a financial crisis. When the level of credit demand expands, both the 
numerator and denominator of the credit-to-GDP ratio tend to increase 
simultaneously, leaving the ratio relatively stable. These authors also propose that 
in order to remove the effects of structural changes in the financial market, the 
cyclical components of the credit-to-GDP ratio must be used as an indicator of 
financial stability.  
This paper considers whether the two policy response functions converge to an 
equilibrium point and examines the factors affecting the stability of equilibrium 
and the speed of convergence to equilibrium. These issues considered in this paper 
were not examined in earlier work which studied the relationships between 
policies, including Cecchetti and Kohler (2014), Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) and 
others. In Cecchetti and Kohler’s (2014) non-cooperation situation, each agency 
assumes that the other agency’s policy is fixed and does not change. Thus, each 
agency’s optimal policy does not depend on the other agency’s action, and there is 
no interaction between policy authorities. This makes Cecchetti and Kohler (2014) 
unable to examine the stability of equilibrium and the speed of convergence.  
The main results of this paper are as follows: First, the paper examines whether 
the two policy response functions converge to a single point, finding that the 
condition of convergence depends on policymakers’ objectives and on the structure 
of the economy. A non-convergence outcome can arise when the FSA places too 
much emphasis on output gap stability in its loss function or when a stronger 
financial stability mandate is assigned to the CB, which does not have proper 
macroprudential tools besides the policy interest rate.  
Second, this paper compares the effectiveness of assigning mandates to each of 
the policy authorities, which have a limited number of policy measures. It finds 
that assigning a small number of mandates is more desirable than assigning a large 
number of them, as equilibrium can be more quickly restored in the former case 
than in the latter. Previous studies examining the assigning of mandates to agencies 
are rare. Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) examine the relationship between fiscal and 
monetary policies. They show that if the fiscal authority focuses only on reducing 
output volatility and the central bank concentrates on reducing inflation volatility, 
then social welfare, i.e., minimizing output volatility and inflation volatility, can be 
maximized. They also show that if the fiscal authority has the additional objective 
of minimizing tax rate volatility, then social welfare cannot be maximized even 
when the central bank attempts to minimize both inflation volatility and output 
 
2The coefficient of correlation between the interest rate gap and the credit-to-GDP ratio was found to be     
-0.161 from the Korean data for the period of 2000.1q to 2015.4q. This low coefficient implies that using the 
credit-to-GDP ratio as an indicator of financial stability can be useful. 
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volatility. This result is not surprising, as Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) assume that 
the fiscal authority’s new objective, minimizing tax rate volatility, is not related to 
social welfare. In addition, this assumption cannot be regarded as reasonable 
because a mandate that does not improve social welfare is assigned to an agency in 
such a case. They also assume that the fiscal authority takes into account the CB’s 
response function while the CB does not consider the fiscal authority’s response 
function. This indicates that their result comes from a model of the fiscal authority 
as a leader and the CB as a follower.  
This paper does not introduce any mandate unrelated to social welfare and 
derives the result in the context of a non-cooperative situation. As all of the 
assigned mandates are related to social welfare in this paper, social welfare 
optimum can be achieved at equilibrium. Thus, this paper does not compare the 
levels of social welfare between different settings of mandates in a state of 
equilibrium. Instead, the paper compares differences in the speed of restoring 
equilibrium between the different settings of mandates among agencies. The speed 
of restoring equilibrium is important in the sense that it is closely related to 
dynamic movements of social welfare. Maximum social welfare can be achieved 
when policy measures such as the policy interest rate and the regulatory capital 
ratio are in equilibrium. The further the policy measures deviate from equilibrium, 
the smaller the social welfare. In addition, the longer the period policy measures 
are not in equilibrium, the greater the loss of social welfare. When external shocks 
occur in the economy, the policy measures need to move to a new state of 
equilibrium. If they swiftly converge to this new state, social welfare can be 
maximized speedily, reducing the loss of social welfare caused by the deviation of 
the policy measures from this new state.  
Third, assuming a full cooperation situation, Cecchetti and Kohler (2014) find 
that the two policy instruments can be substituted when the agencies have two 
objectives, whereas they are not substitutable when the agencies have the 
additional objective of financial stability. This paper examines whether the two 
instruments are substitutable in the non-cooperation situation, finding that even 
when the financial stability mandate is assigned to the central bank, there is a 
substitution relationship between the two instruments. 
This paper derives policy response functions from a simple model, as in the 
second strand of studies. The model is composed of the IS curve equation, the 
Phillips curve equation, and the credit-to-GDP ratio equation. There are two types 
of policy authorities: monetary and financial supervisory authorities. As policy 
instruments, the central bank (CB) has the policy interest rate and the financial 
supervisory authority (FSA) has the counter-cyclical capital ratio. Each policy 
authority has its own loss function and exercises its policy measure to minimize 
loss. Solving the minimization problem of each policymaker’s loss function 
provides their policy response functions, which are expressed in terms of the 
inflation gap, the output gap, the credit gap and the other policymakers’ policy 
measures. 
Monetary policy can affect the real economy through many different channels. 
Among them, the interest rate channel and the credit channel are the most 
important ones. The credit channel means that the credit supply can affect the real 
economy (Disyatat 2010). The credit-to-GDP ratio is known to reflect the credit 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 39 NO. 1       The Relationship Between Monetary and Macroprudential Policies  23 
supply well (Drehmann et al. 2011, Drehmann and Juselius 2013). The credit 
supply can also affect inflation as liquidly is created by credit in the banking 
system and liquidity itself determines inflation according to the quantity theory of 
money. Considering this, the credit-to-GDP ratio is included in the IS and Phillips 
curves. 
 
II. Policy Authorities’ Optimal Behavior 
 
A. The Structure of the Model 
 
To construct the model, the equations for the IS curve and the Phillips curve are 
used, along with the equation for the credit-to-GDP ratio. Considering that 
generally, economic agents forecast future inflation based on information available 
at a current point in time, the IS curve in equation (1) is introduced.3 Output 
 1 ty   is affected by the real policy interest rate   1t t ti E    and the credit-to-
GDP ratio  1 ,tcyr   inflation  1t   by the output gap ( ( 1) ( 1)( )nt ty y   and the 
credit-to-GDP ratio,4 and the credit-to-GDP ratio by the real policy interest rate 
and the regulatory capital ratio ( ).tcar
5 The two policy measures, the nominal 
policy interest rate ( )ti  and the regulatory capital ratio, affect the three 
endogenous variables — output, inflation, and the credit-to-GDP ratio — with a 
time lag. Policymakers adjust their instruments preemptively on the basis of their 
expectations with regard to the next period’s output gap, inflation gap and credit-
to-GDP ratio gap (credit gap hereafter).  
 
<IS curve> 
(1)           1 0 1 2 1 3 1 , 1t t t t t t y ty a a y a i E a cyr            
 
<Phillips Curve> 
(2)  1 0 1 2 1 1 3 1 , 1nt t t t t tb b b y y b cyr              
 
<Credit-to-GDP ratio (cyclical part)> 
(3)   1 0 1 2 1 3 , 1t t t t t t c tcyr c c cyr c i E c car           
 
After taking    tE   on both sides of equations (1)~(3), the equations are 
rearranged into  1 ,t tE     1t tE y   and  1 .t tE cyr   They can then be expressed 
 
3If a forward-looking IS curve is introduced, ܽଵݕ௧ on the right hand side of equation (1) can then be replaced 
with 	ܽଵܧ௧[ݕ௧ାଶ].	In this case, the main result of this paper will still hold, as both ܧ௧[ݕ௧ାଶ] and ݕ௧	are known 
variables at time t and do not change due to changes in policy instruments such as ݅௧ and ܿܽݎ௧.  
4As credit and liquidity (or money) are two sides of the same coin, an increase in credit tends to increase 
inflation, fitting into the quantity theory of money.  
5ݔ௧ାଵ௡  denotes the potential, natural or target value of ݔ௧ାଵ. 
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in terms of the two policy measures as the following equations (4)~(6).  
 
(4)     1 ,0 , , 1/t t i t c tE B B i B car         
  3 2 2 2 2 3 21 ,b c b a b a c       
  
   
,0 0 2 0 3 2 3 0 1
2 1 1 1 3 2 3 ,
t
n
t t t
B b b a b b a c b
b a y y c b b a cyr
 

    
      
 
 
, 3 2 2 2 2 3 2
, 3 3 2 3 3
,
,
i
c
B b c b a b a c
B b c b a c


  
    
 
(5)     1 ,0 , ,1 /t t y y i t y c tE y B B i B car       
  
   
   
,0 0 2 0 3 0 3 2 0 2 3 0 0 3 2
1 2 3 2 1 3 2
2 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 ,
1
y
t t
n
t t
B a a b a c a c b a b c a b c
b a a c a b c y
b a a c y c a a b cyr


     
   
       
 
,i 3 2 2
,c 3 3 2 3 3
,
,
y
y
B a c a
B a c a b c
 
    
 
(6)     1 ,0 , ,1 /t t c c i t c c tE cyr B B i B car      
    
 
,0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 2
2 1 2 2 1 1
1
,
c t
n
t t t
B c c b c b a c b a c b a cyr
c b b c a y y 
     
  
   
 
, 2
,c 3 2 2
,
1
c i
c
B c
B c a b

    
 
The sign of   in the three equations above and that of  2 21 a b  in equation 
(6) need to be positive for the effects of the policy interest rate and the regulatory 
capital ratio on output, inflation and the credit-to-GDP ratio to have the expected 
signs. 
Let  1t tE x   be the expected value of 1tx   at time t  when 0ti   and 
0,tcar   which means that there is no change in the policy measures from the 
previous period. Let ti  be 1t ti i   and tcar  be 1.t tcar car   The expected 
values of the three endogenous variables above can then be expressed in terms of 
their values in the absence of policy changes and changes in the policy variables by 
the following functions (7)~(9).  
 
(7)        1 1 , ,/ /t t t t i t c tE E B i B car            
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(8)        1 1 , ,/ /t t t t y i t y c tE y E y B i B car         
 
(9)       1 , ,1 / /t t t c i t c c ttE cyr E cyr B i B car            
 
B. Non-cooperation Equilibrium 
 
1. The Central Bank’s Behavior  
 
In a non-cooperative situation, each policy authority observes the others’ 
behaviors and then decides whether to maximize its own utility function. When the 
financial stability mandate is assigned to a CB, its objective can be described as 
minimizing the inflation gap, the output gap and the credit gap by means of 
equation (10).6   and   refer to the weights of the output gap and the credit 
gap, respectively.7 
 
(10)         2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1min CB n n nt t t t t t t t t tLS E E y y E cyr cyr                
w.r.t. ti   
 
The optimal policy interest rate, which minimizes the above loss function with 
respect to ,ti  is expressed by the following equation (11) in terms of the 
inflation gap, the output gap, the credit gap and the regulatory capital ratio. 
 
(11) 
   
 
*
1 1 11
11  
CB n n
tt t t y t tt
n
c t t car tt
i E E y y
E cyr cyr car
   
 
  

          
     
  
 
   2 2 3 2 21 / , / , / ,y cA a a c A c A                
        3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 21 1 / ,car c b a b a a b a a c c a b A             
      22 22 3 2 21A a a c c        
 
Equation (11) shows that the CB raises the policy interest rate in response to an 
expansion in the inflation gap, the output gap and/or the credit gap. Moreover, as 
either the weight of the output gap ( )  or that of the credit gap ( )  in the loss 
 
6The credit gap refers to the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend or target level 
set by the authorities. 
7Curdia and Woodford (2009) note that this type of loss function can be obtained when there is financial 
friction. On the other hand, we can also use this type of loss function when simply assuming that the CB has the 
three mandates and acts according to a Taylor-type rule. 
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function rises, the intensity of the response of the policy interest rate to each gap  
( ),y c   becomes stronger. When there is a rise in the regulatory capital ratio, the 
CB cuts its policy interest rate, which implies there is a substitutive relationship 
between the two policies. Contrary to the results shown by Cecchetti and Kohler 
(2014), the substitutive relationship holds even when the financial stability 
mandate is included in the CB’s loss function, as the policy interest rate and the 
regulatory capital ratio affect the credit gap in the same manner.8 
Compared to the situation in which the CB does not have a financial stability 
objective ( ),0   the intensity of the response of the policy interest rate to the 
output gap and the inflation gap becomes lower.9 By responding to the credit gap, 
the CB can reduce the need to respond strongly to the output gap and the inflation 
gap, as the shrinkage of the credit gap tends to reduce the other two gaps. 
Meanwhile, the intensity of the response of the policy interest rate to changes in the 
regulatory capital ratio ( )car  becomes larger when the financial stability 
objective is included.10 
 
2. The Financial Supervisory Authority’s Behavior 
 
The FSA may have different objectives from the CB, and its decision and 
optimal behavior tend to vary depending on its objectives. This section considers 
three cases according to how many objectives the FSA has.  
 
(a) FSA objective 1: Achieving Financial Stability 
 
When the FSA has a single objective of lessening the volatility of the credit gap, 
its loss function can be determined by the following equation (12): 
 
(12)   21 1min FS nt t t tLS E cyr cyr    
w.r.t. tcar   
 
The optimal regulatory capital ratio is derived as a function of the credit gap and 
the policy interest rate. 
 
(13) 
 
 
* 1 21
3 2 21
n
t t ttFS
t
E cyr cyr c i
car
c a b
        
 
Equation (13) shows that as the effect of the regulatory capital ratio on the 
 
8Cecchetti and Kohler (2014) use the gap between loan interest rates and the policy interest rate as an 
indicator of financial stability. In their model, a rise in the policy interest rate reduces the gap, while a rise in the 
regulatory capital ratio expands the gap. 
9The value of ܣሚ in equation (11) becomes larger when ߜ(ܿଶ)ଶ	is included. 
10߲ߥ௖௔௥/߲ߜ	=ܽଶܿଶܿଷߔ൫ܾଶ(1 − ߔ) + ߛ(ܽଶ + ܽଷܿଶ)൯/(ܣሚ)ଶ > 0 
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credit-to-GDP ratio (ܿଷ) increases, the intensity of the responses of the regulatory 
capital ratio to the credit gap and to the policy interest rate decreases. The FSA 
reduces its regulatory capital ratio when the policy interest rate is raised because a 
rise in the policy interest rate can bring about a reduction in the credit gap. With the 
CB’s policy interest rate and the FSA’s regulatory capital ratio changes affecting 
each other, the movements can either converge to equilibrium or diverge over time. 
The condition for converging to equilibrium can be expressed by the following 
equation (14). The speed of convergence increases as the value of equation (14) 
increases.11  
 
(14) 
* *
1 0
CB FS
t t
t t
i car
car i
           
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. THE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS OF THE CB AND THE FSA 
Note: The solid (dotted) line is the response function of the CB (the FSA), and ߗ௧ is the set of information 
available at time t. 
 
In this situation, where the FSA focuses on reducing credit gap volatility, the 
condition of convergence is satisfied as the following equation (15) is always 
positive. 
 
(15) 
   
 
* *
2 2 2 2 3 2
2 2
1
1 0
1
CB FS
t t
t t
a b a a a ci car
car i A a b
                 
 
 
As the FSA uses one instrument to achieve one goal in this case, at equilibrium, 
 
11For convergence, the slope of the response function of the policy interest rate (=∂ΔitCB*/∂Δcart) in Figure (1) 
must be smaller than that of the regulatory capital ratio (=1/(∂ΔcartFS*/∂Δit)), meaning that the relationship of 
߲ΔitCB*/∂Δcart<1/(∂ΔcartFS*/∂Δit) must hold. Meanwhile, as the difference between the slopes of the two response 
functions expands, the value of equation (14) and speed of convergence both increase. 
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the credit gap converges to zero. The speed of convergence, however, can differ 
depending on the preferences and parameter values. If the weight of the output gap 
( )  in the CB’s loss function increases or that of the credit gap ( )  decreases, 
the speed of convergence increases.12  
 
(b) Objective 2: Achieving Financial and Output Stability 
 
In this case, the FSA’s loss function is expressed as a function of the output gap 
volatility as well as the credit gap volatility. 
 
(16)      2 21 1 1 1min FS n nt t t t t t tLS E y y E cyr cyr         
w.r.t. tcar   
 
When the FSA has keen interest in maintaining microprudential stability, 
supporting individual banks’ profitability is important, which can again be backed 
by improving business activity overall. In this sense, the FSA may have a great deal 
of interest in reducing the output volatility relative to the credit volatility, causing 
the value of ߢ	in equation (16) to decrease.13 The solution of the loss-minimizing 
function (16) produces the optimal regulatory capital ratio in terms of the credit 
gap, the output gap and the policy interest rate. 
 
(17) 
       
   
* 3 2 3 1 2 2 11 1
22
3 2 2 3 2 3
1
1
n n
t t t t i tt tFS
t
a a b E y y a b E cyr cyr i
car
c a b a a b
 

                 


  
    2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 1i c a b a a b a a c        
 
The condition for convergence of the response functions can be expressed by 
equation (18). This condition is met only when the value of 1  in the numerator 
on the right-hand side of equation (18) is greater than the value of 2.  
 
(18)    
* *
2 1 2
2 2
2 2 3 2 3[ 1 )
1
CB FS
t t
t
ai car
car i A a b a a b
 

                 

 
  
    21 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 21 ( )a b b a c a b b c          
  22 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2( )a a b b c a b b a b b c c          
 
When the FSA has more interest in output stability than in financial stability, the 
 
12The partial derivatives on the right-hand side of equation (15) with respect to ߛ and ߜ	have a positive sign 
and a negative sign, respectively.  
13As the FSA is a government body, which is influenced by national elections in the country, it may have 
short-sighted views, assigning greater importance to output growth than to financial market stabilization. 
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value of   decreases, increasing the possibility of non-convergence.14 This result 
implies that it is desirable for macroprudential measures to be used primarily for 
lessening the credit gap, but not for lessening the output gap. Meanwhile, when the 
CB has a strong mandate of financial stability, the values of   and 2  in 
equation (18) increase, increasing the likelihood of non-convergence. Either an 
increase in the value of   or a decrease in   also tends to reduce the speed of 
convergence to equilibrium.15 A large value of   indicates that the CB considers 
output stability as an important task. The relationship in equation (18) indicates that 
if the value of   increases, the probability of convergence and the speed of 
converging to equilibrium tend to rise. 
 
(c) Objective 3: Achieving Financial, Output, and Inflation Stability 
 
In this case, the FSA has the same loss function as the CB, as in equation (10), 
and it uses the regulatory capital ratio to minimize the function. The FSA’s optimal 
regulatory capital ratio is determined by equation (19). 
 
(19) 
   
 
*
1 1 11
11 
FS n n
tt t t y t tt
n
c t t i tt
car E E y y
E cyr cyr i
   
 
  

          
     
  
     3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2/ , / , 1 / ,y cb a b C a a b C a b C                
       
 
3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2
2 2 21 / ,
i b b a a b c b b a a b a a c a
c a b C
 

      
     
      2 2 23 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 21C c b a b a b a a b         
 
When each of the three gaps expands and the policy interest rate falls, the FSA 
raises the regulatory capital ratio. In this case, with the same objective function, the 
condition for convergence of the response functions is expressed by the following 
equation, and the condition is satisfied. 
 
(20) 
   * * 2 2 23 2 3 2( ) ( )1 0CB FSt t
t t
c a b bi car
car i AC
                  
 
 
14In the model, the regulatory capital ratio directly affects the credit-to-GDP ratio, while the policy interest 
rate directly affects the output level as well as the credit-to-GDP ratio. This gives the policy interest rate a 
comparative advantage over the regulatory capital ratio in lessening the output gap and the inflation gap, and the 
regulatory capital ratio has this advantage over the policy interest rate in lessening the credit gap. Thus, it is not 
effective for the regulatory capital ratio to be used for controlling the output gap, as the regulatory capital ratio 
needs to change by a large amount to have a significant influence on the output gap. If the regulatory capital ratio 
moves in such a manner, the credit gap changes significantly, in which case the policy interest rate would also 
need to move greatly because the policy interest rate is not an effective instrument for controlling the credit gap 
compared to the regulatory capital ratio. This chain reaction can lead to non-convergence. 
15The partial derivative of the right-hand side of equation (18) with respect to ߜ has a negative sign, while 
those with respect to ߢ and ߛ have positive signs. 
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3. Assigning Mandates to Agencies 
 
This section examines whether assigning a small number of mandates to 
authorities is more effective than assigning a large number of them when the policy 
authorities act in non-cooperative situations. Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) used the 
context of a lead-follower situation to study additional objectives of the fiscal 
agency which are unrelated to social welfare. This setting naturally leads to the 
outcome of a suboptimal level of social welfare at equilibrium. Unlike Davig and 
Gürkaynak (2015), this paper considers the case where all of objectives assigned to 
the agencies are related to social welfare in a non-cooperative situation. As all of 
the objectives are related to social welfare, the social welfare optimum can always 
be achieved in equilibrium. The speeds of restoring equilibrium, however, differ 
with different settings of mandates. Comparing the speeds of restoring equilibrium, 
this paper evaluates the effectiveness of assigning mandates to agencies. 
For this analysis, two situations are considered: one with a single objective for 
each policy authority and the other with multiple objectives. In both situations, the 
CB has the policy interest rate as its own instrument, and the FSA has the 
regulatory capital ratio. In the first situation, the CB’s objective is to reduce 
inflation gap volatility while the FSA’s objective is to reduce credit gap volatility. 
With one objective and one policy measure for each policymaker, each gap 
becomes zero at equilibrium. The CB’s optimal policy interest rate is *ti  that 
satisfies   21 1 / 0,nt t t tE i       and the FSA’s optimal regulatory capital 
ratio is *tcar  that satisfies   21 1 / 0.nt t t tE cyr cyr car     
In the second situation, each authority has two objectives: reducing inflation gap 
volatility and credit gap volatility with its own instrument. As the economy in this 
situation has two objectives and two policy measures as a whole, each gap 
converges to zero at equilibrium following the Tinbergen rule. Thus, in a state of 
equilibrium in the second situation, the same outcome can be obtained as in the 
first situation. Let the CB and the FSA have the following equations (21) as their 
objective functions. The CB’s optimal policy interest rate, * ,ti  must satisfy the 
relationship of / 0CBt tLS i    and the FSA’s optimal regulatory capital ratio, 
*,tcar  needs to do the same for / 0.FSt tLS car    
 
(21)    2 21 1 1 1min ( ) ( )CB n nt t t t t t tLS E E cyr cyr           
   2 21 1 1 1min ( ) ( )FS n nt t t t t t tLS E E cyr cyr           
 
For each of the two situations, the policy response functions and the speed of 
convergence to equilibrium can be derived. The optimal policy is expressed by the 
following equations (22) ~ (25).  
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(Optimal policy with a single objective) 
(22) 
   
 
1 1 3 3 2 3*
1
n
tt t t
t
E c b b a car
i
             
 
(23) 
 
 
1 21*
3 2 21
n
t t tt
t
E cyr cyr c i
car
c a b
         
 
 
(Optimal policy with multiple objectives)  
(24) 
     
   
1 1 2 11*
2 2
2
1
1
n n
tt t t t car tt
t
E c E cyr cyr car
i
c
   

              
    
 
     3 3 3 2 2 2 21 1car c b a b c a b        
 
(25) 
   
    
1 1 11*
2 2
3 3 3 2 2 21
n n
tt t c t t i tt
t
E E cyr cyr i
car
c b a b a b
    

             
  
   
   
    
2 3 3 2 2
3 3 2 2 2 2
, 1 ,
1 1
c
i
b a b a b
b a b c a b
  
 
   
       
 
The speed of convergence for each situation is derived using the following 
equations (26)∼(27). The higher the following value is, the faster the speed 
becomes. 
 
(The speed of convergence with a single objective) 
 
(26)   
* *
2 2
2 2
1 0
1 1
t t
t t
i car a b
car i a b
             
  
 
(The speed of convergence with multiple objectives) 
 
(27) 
  
  
* *
2 2 1 2
1 2
3
1 0t t
t t
a bi car if
car i
                    
 
   
  
        
1 2 2
2 2 3 3 2
22 22
3 2 3 3 2 2 2
1 1 ,
,
1 ( ) 1
a b
c b a b
c b a b a b 
   
  
      
    
 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
32 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2017 
The difference between the speed of convergence with a single objective and 
that with multiple objectives is expressed by equation (28). 
 
(28) 
 
  
2 2 1 2 3
2 2 3
0
1 1
a b
a b
        
  
 
      
2
1 2 2 2
22
2 3 3 2
22
3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2
1
( )
2
,1
) )
,
( 1
c a b
b a b
c a b b a b a b c b a b a b


  
   
      
  
 
The speed of convergence to equilibrium is faster in the first situation than in the 
second situation, while the equilibrium outcomes are identical. This implies that the 
first situation with a single objective for each policy authority is a more desirable 
means of achieving the objective compared to the second situation.  
Another weakness with multiple objectives is that the policy response functions, 
as shown in equations (24)∼(25), have more complex expressions than in the 
single-objective situation. Thus, it may be more difficult for policy authorities to 
find an optimal level of policy instruments, as many parameters are involved in the 
multiple-objective situation.16 
At this stage, we consider the difference between assigning one objective to each 
institution and assigning one to an institution and two to the other. It is found that 
the former way still more quickly arrives at the equilibrium point. Let the speed of 
convergence when assigning one objective to each institution be SW11, let 
assigning two objectives to the CB and one to the FSA be SW21, and let assigning 
one to the CB and two to the FSA be SW12.17 The differences between SW11 and 
SW21 and between SW11 and SW12 are then expressed by (29) and (30), 
respectively. 
 
(29)        
2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
11 21 0
1 1 1
a b c
SW SW
a b c


       
  
 
(30) 
 
      
2
2 2 3 3 2
2 2
2 2 3 3 2 2 2
11 12 0
1 1 1
a b b a b
SW SW
a b b a b a b
         
  
 
There are several caveats with regard to this result. If the objective of the CB is 
to reduce credit gap volatility while the objective of the FSA is to reduce inflation 
gap volatility, then the policy response functions do not converge — a situation that 
 
16Changes in the structure of an economy tend to bring about changes in the parameters and the way policy 
instruments are operated. This adverse effect would be more significant in the multiple-objective situation than in 
the single-objective case. 
17When one mandate is given to the CB (or the FSA), reducing the inflation (or credit) gap mandate is 
assigned. 
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may be less effective than the multiple-objective situation. Another caveat is that if 
there is uncertainty in either the effectiveness of the policy instruments or the 
objectives of each policy authority, then it is more effective for each authority to 
pursue multiple objectives than a single objective, as mentioned by Smets (2014).18 
Finally, there may be differences between the CB’s evaluation of the gaps and the 
FSB’s evaluation. As the CB has more information about the macro-economy than 
does the FSB, the CB is more likely than the FSA to assess the gaps accurately. In 
this case, assigning multiple objectives would produce a better outcome. 
 
C. Full Cooperation Equilibrium 
 
If the CB and the FSA have the same objective, they can then decide fully to 
coordinate and exercise the two instruments simultaneously in order to achieve 
their common goal. This full cooperation equilibrium can also be applied to a case 
in which the CB can exercise the regulatory capital ratio as its instrument. The two 
authorities’ common loss function is expressed by equation (31). 
 
(31)         2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1min n n nt t t t t t t t t tLS E E y y E cyr cyr                
w.r.t. ,t ti car   
 
In the case of full cooperation, the optimal policy interest rate and the optimal 
regulatory capital ratio are expressed in terms of the output gap, the inflation gap 
and the credit gap as equations (32) ~ (33). 
 
(Optimal policy interest rate) 
 
(32) 
     
 
1 1 1 11 1*
2 2
2 3 2( ) ( )
n n n
tt t y t t c t tt t
t
E E y y E cyr cyr
i
a b b
    
  
                       
    
    
    
2 2 2 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 2 2 2
3 2 3 2 3 3 2
1 ,
1 ,y
c
b a b b a a b
b b a b a b
a a b b b a b
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  
  
   
   
    
  
 
  
 
18Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) also state that the FSA may be slow to act for various reasons, such as 
political considerations and the time lag in gathering and analyzing information. 
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(Optimal regulatory capital ratio) 
 
(33) 
     
 
1 1 1 11 1*
2 2
3 2 3 2( ) ( )
n n n
tt t y t t c t tt t
t
E E y y E cyr cyr
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c a b b
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  
    
   
  
 
Equation (32) shows that the optimal policy interest rate rises either when the 
output gap expands ( 0)y   or when the credit gap shrinks ( )0 .c   As the 
regulatory capital ratio rises when the credit gap expands, it may be effective for 
the CB not to raise the policy interest rate in response to the credit gap expansion 
and to focus on the other objectives instead. The CB’s response to the inflation gap  
( )  varies depending on the preferences and the values of the parameters. When 
either the effect of the output gap on inflation 2( )b  is large or when the weight of 
the output gap in the loss function ( )  is relatively small compared to that of the 
credit gap ( ),  the optimal policy interest rate rises in response to the widening 
inflation gap ( )0 .   
While the optimal regulatory capital ratio rises in equation (33) either when the 
credit gap expands ( 0)c   or when the output gap shrinks ( 0),y   its 
response to the inflation gap ( )  depends on the parameter values. This result 
implies that monetary policy and macroprudential policy must be focused on areas 
where they have a comparative advantage over each other in exercising policy 
measures.  
In this case, the loss function can be expressed in terms of the three gaps by 
equation (34). This indicates that when the three gaps converge to zero, so does the 
value of the loss function. 
 
(34) 
 
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Meanwhile, when the two authorities have the same objective function, non-
cooperation equilibrium converges to full cooperation equilibrium. In terms of 
social welfare, however, non-cooperation equilibrium may be inferior to full 
cooperation equilibrium, as it requires a certain period of time for convergence. 
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D. Leader-follower Equilibrium 
 
1. The FSA as a Leader 
 
An agent may act as a Stackelberg leader. Previous studies have considered the 
FSA as a leader and the CB as a follower, as the policy interest rate can be changed 
frequently while the regulatory capital ratio cannot. When the FSA is a leader, it 
can move first as it knows the CB’s response function, which is used as one of its 
constraints. One of the necessary conditions for an agent to become a leader is that 
it needs to know the others’ response functions. Monetary policy tends to follow a 
rule similar to the Taylor rule, while the FSA prefers to use its discretion in 
exercising its measures. This could make monetary policy more predictable than 
macroprudential policy, making it easier for the FSA to behave as a leader.  
Here, we assume that the loss function of the FSA is FStLS  and that the CB’s 
response function is  *Δ Δ , .CBt t ti cg car   The FSA then derives the optimal 
regulatory capital ratio to minimize its loss function, as in equation (35).  
 
(35)     *min , , , , ,FS CBt t t t t t t tLS f car i f car cg car           
w.r.t. tcar   
 
When the FSA’s objective is to minimize credit gap volatility, as shown in 
equation (12), its optimal policy is expressed by equation (36), which shows that 
the optimal regulatory capital ratio depends not only on the credit gap but also on 
the inflation gap and the output gap.  
 
(36) 
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The FSA raises the regulatory capital ratio when the credit gap expands ( 0)c    
and lowers it when the inflation gap and the output gap expand 
0 an 0)d( y   . As it expects that the CB will raise the policy interest rate in 
response to the expansion of the inflation gap and the output gap, the FSA focuses 
on reducing the credit gap, which is its sole objective. The FSA’s response to the 
gaps depends on the CB’s preferences and on other parameters. If a stronger 
mandate for output stability is given to the CB, the FSA’s response to the credit gap 
and the inflation gap becomes weaker and the response to the output gap becomes 
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greater.19 This implies, as Davig and Gürkaynak (2015) predict, that an agent’s 
response to its objectives is affected by the structure of other agents’ loss functions.  
On the other hand, when the FSA’s objective is to reduce both the output gap and 
the credit gap, the FSA raises the regulatory capital ratio in response to credit gap 
expansion and output gap shrinkage, while its response to the inflation gap depends 
on the parameter values (refer to the Appendix).20  
 
2. The CB as a Leader 
 
As information advantage enables an agent to become a leader, the CB may 
become a leader under certain circumstances. If the counter-cyclical capital ratio is 
exercised under a pre-committed rule, the CB could know the FSA’s response 
function, making it easier for the CB to become a leader. If the CB acts as a leader, 
it will minimize its loss function, as in equation (10), predicting the FSA responses 
according to equation (13) if the FSA’s objective is to reduce credit gap volatility. 
The CB’s optimal policy can be obtained by substituting equation (13) for the 
regulatory capital ratio (߂ܿܽݎ௧) in its loss function and minimizing it.21 This 
process produces the CB’s optimal policy in the form of equation (37). The policy 
interest rate rises when either the inflation gap or the output gap expands, and it 
falls when the credit gap expands. Table 1 in the Appendix shows that a leader is 
not trying to reduce all of the three gaps, leaving a follower to bear the burden. 
 
(37) 
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When the two policy authorities know each other’s response functions, both of 
them may try to become a leader. This situation can be referred to as a “leader-
leader model.” In this situation, there is no convergence of response functions, and 
each authority sets its own instrument to maximize its utility function.  
Figure 2 shows an example of the response functions and indifference curves for 
each authority. The authority’s indifference curves have an oval shape as the loss 
function of an institution has the form of  2, 1 1, 2,
1
.
n
t j t j t j t
j
E GAP i car 

       22 
 
19 This relationship can be verified by determining ∂∆cart*/∂γ  with equation (36). Let DM36  be the 
denominator of equation (36). It is then found that ∂(ψc/DM36)/∂γ<0, ߲(ψπ/DM36)/∂γ>0 and ∂(ψy/DM36)/∂γ<0. 
20The coefficient of the regulatory capital ratio’s response on the inflation gap is more likely to have a 
negative sign as the weight of the credit gap in the FSA’s loss function (ߢ) increases (see the Appendix). 
21If the FSA’s objective is to reduce the volatility of the output gap as well as the credit gap, then equation (17) 
can be used for the substitution. 
22If an authority has a single objective, then her indifference curve is expressed as a straight line. 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 39 NO. 1       The Relationship Between Monetary and Macroprudential Policies  37 
 
FIGURE 2. THE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS AND INDIFFERENCE CURVES 
Note: The solid (dotted) straight line is the response function of the CB (the FSA). 
The solid (dotted) ellipse is the indifference curve of the CB (the FSA). ߗ௧ 
denotes the set of information available at time t. 
 
 
An authority’s utility increases as the ellipse becomes smaller. If the FSA is a 
leader, it will set the regulatory capital ratio at point A, and if the CB is a leader, the 
policy interest rate is set at point B. Point A is optimal for the FSA in the long run. 
The FSA may temporarily increase its utility by moving leftward and downward 
from point A. Such moves, however, cause the CB to move alongside its response 
function line, eventually decreasing the FSA’s utility at that point compared to that 
at point A. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Using the IS curve, the Phillips curve, the credit-to-GDP ratio equation and 
policymakers’ objective functions, this paper examines the interaction between 
monetary and macroprudential policies with different levels of cooperation 
between two policy authorities, i.e., non-cooperation, full cooperation, and the 
leader-follower relationship. When the policy authorities have the same objectives, 
then it is more likely that the authorities engage in full cooperation. If one of the 
policy authorities has more information about the other’s response function, it may 
act as a Stackelberg leader. In the model, the CB and the FSA can exercise the 
policy interest rate and the regulatory capital ratio, respectively, as their policy 
instruments. 
In the non-cooperation situation, each policy authority’s optimal response is to 
tighten its policy measures when the other authority’s policy measure is loosened. 
This substitutive relationship holds even when the CB has as its objective financial 
stability as well as inflation and output stability.  
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Whether the policy response functions converge to equilibrium depends on the 
authorities’ preferences and the parameter values in the model. As the FSA places 
greater emphasis on output stability or when a stronger financial stability mandate 
is assigned to the CB, the possibility of non-convergence becomes higher and the 
speed of convergence to equilibrium tends to decrease, adding costs to policy 
operations. Meanwhile, if the CB considers output stability as an important task, 
the probability of convergence and the speed of converging to equilibrium are high.  
When the CB has the financial stability objective, the intensity of the response of 
the policy interest rate to the output gap and the inflation gap decreases compared 
to when the CB does not have a financial stability mandate. 
In the context of non-cooperation, this paper analyses the effectiveness of the 
manner in which mandates are assigned to authorities. Assigning multiple 
objectives to authorities with a limited number of policy measures may be less 
desirable when seeking to restore stability quickly as compared to assigning a small 
number of objectives. This condition arises because, in the situation with multiple 
objectives, more time is required for the policy response functions to reach a state 
of Nash equilibrium. It is also more difficult in such a case for policymakers to find 
the proper levels of policy measures, as the optimal policy response functions have 
more complex forms.  
When the policy authorities fully cooperate with each other, their responses to 
each gap are different. In response to the widening of the output gap, monetary 
policy tightening and macroprudential policy loosening are optimal. In the case of 
a credit gap expansion, the optimal responses would be a tightening of 
macroprudential policy and a loosening of monetary policy. The direction of 
optimal responses to the widening of the inflation gap depends on the economic 
structure and the preferences of the policymakers. 
An information advantage over the other party enables an agent to act as a 
Stackelberg leader. If the FSA acts as a leader, it raises the regulatory capital ratio 
in response to an expansion in the credit gap and to shrinkage in the output gap. On 
the other hand, if the CB is a leader, it raises the policy interest rate when the 
inflation gap and the output gap expand and when the credit gap contracts. In either 
of the above two cases, a leader attempts to reduce only one or two gaps among the 
three. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FSA’s Optimal Response when acting as a leader with two objectives 
  
(38) 
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TABLE A1—OPTIMAL POLICY COMBINATION 
Note: 1) If the FSA does not have the mandate of reducing inflation gap volatility, then this changes to “no 
response.” 2) If the FSA does not have the mandate of reducing output gap volatility, then this changes to “no 
response.” 3) This depends on the parameter values. As the impact of the output gap on inflation becomes larger or 
the authorities consider output stability less important and financial stability more important, the optimal monetary 
policy and the optimal macroprudential policy become tightening and loosening policies, respectively. 4) This 
result is obtained in cases when the FSA’s objective is to reduce volatility in the credit gap. 5) If the FSA’s 
objective is to lessen output volatility as well as credit volatility, this changes to “depends on the situation.” 
  
Relationship between 
policy authorities 
Policies Widening of  
the inflation gap 
Widening of  
the output gap 
Widening of  
the credit gap  
Non Cooperation Monetary Policy  Tightening Tightening Tightening 
MP Policy Tightening1) Tightening2) Tightening 
Full Cooperation Monetary Policy t/l3) Tightening Loosening 
MP Policy t/l3) Loosening Tightening 
The FSA is a leader4) Monetary Policy Tightening Tightening Tightening 
MP Policy Loosening5) Loosening Tightening 
The CB is a leader4) Monetary Policy Tightening Tightening Loosening 
MP Policy No response No response Tightening 
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